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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HAROLD D. RAINFORD
Plaintiff and Respondent
vs.
WILLIAM R. RYTTING AND
SUZANNE H. RYTTING
Defendants and Appellants

Case No.
11276

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for the purchase price of stock,
which contract of purchase was unconditionally guaranteed by the defendants. Payments were not made in
accordance with the contract. This suit was commenced
against the defendants, the unconditional guarantors.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Smmnary Judgment was granted in favor of plaintiff and against the defendants.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent asks the court to affirm the Summary
·fnclgment of the 'l1rial Court.
1

STATEMENT OF FAcrrs
Plaintiff does not agTP(' ·with the statement of fad
of defendants because it is not eomplde, nor rntire!)·
accurate, and makes statement:::; of fact which are not
contained in the record as if they ,,-ere. Therefore, r>laintiff and respondent present the follo\ving:
The defendants operated a ladies dress shop in Yakima, \Vashington known as rrhe Carriage Homw, lne.,
a corporation. The store was operated by Mr. and Mrs.
Rytting and plaintiff was an inactive officer and stoC'kholder (R. 33). The plaintiff had purchased 25 shares
of stock in the corporation. The defendants at all times
managed and operated the store and defendants became
desirous of purchasing plaintiff's stock so the defendants
and plaintiff entered into a contract, Exhibit "A" a copy
of \vhich is at the end of this Brief, the subject matter
of this lawsuit, by the terms of which The Carriage
House, Inc. would purchase the 25 shares of stock nf
the plaintiff. That said agreement was guaranteed by
the defendants personally, which guarantee is as follows:
"Undersigned hereby personally guarantee
full payment and performance of the above conditional sales contract by The Carriage House,
Inc."
/s/

\Villiam R. Ryttiug

/s/

Suzanne IL Rytting

By the terms of the agreement the stock was to be pai<l
for at the rate of $100.00 per month, commencing on tlw
10th day of August, 1966 together \vith G% intNest.
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That the eontrad providPd that to secure the oblii.;ation the vtindor should retain the title and possession
('f said stock, but that the dPfrndants should have all
tl1e rights to tl1P said stock including the right to vote
~aid stoek and receive dividends thl•refrom, stock only
to lH' l1eld as security. None of the assets of the corporation \rere held as security.
Paragraph 7 specifically proyides that the contract
eontained the entire agreeme>nt between the parties.
That after the purchase of the stock from plaintiff,
defendants Ryttings, disposed of all of the inventory and
merchandise by sale and also disposed of all of the store
fixtures, and were to take the corporate structures to
Ptah (R. 23, 33). Plaintiff received no fixtures or aceounts receivable (R. 32, 34).
Defendants answered that the contract was illegal,
\'oid or voidable and no consideration. (R. 16) At no
place in their answer did they say that the plaintiff got
('itlwr fix tu res or accounts receivable or plead payment.

m. 5)

In no affidavit did the defendants unequivocally state
that the plaintiff got any equipment or collected any
llloney. Defendants in the answer to the interrogatories
1n1·rely say that defendants CLAIM plaintiff did. (R. 16)

In the Affidavit of John S. Moore, (R. 23) it states
t]ip R~rttings took the books to Utah, and this has not been
il1·nit'd by defendants.
3

Defendants were the O}JC'l'ators of the busi1w~s at
thr time the contract was entere>cl into. That if said (·orporation liabilities Pxceecled its assets and was vah1Plt>~~
on May 27, 19GG, the date oi' tlw contract, such iufonuation was known to the deft~mlants herein, lrnt unknown to
plaintiff. (R. 33, 3±)
That the defendants made all of the decisions a~
officers and directors and stockholders and said corporation pertaining to its liquidations and moving to Utah
and sale of stock. ( R. 33)
The contract is clear that Mr. Rainford was to haYP
nothing further to do with the company. Rainford hnd
no right to vote the stock. The stock was being voted by
the Ryttings. It is very clear in the contract that all of
the corporation authority "-as to be vested in the Rytting~
after the contract was entered into.
The contract provides for the payment of monPy
only. Nothing "-as said about fopudating accounts receivable or sale of air conditioner in the contract.
Defendants in their Brief say the understanding that
the proceeds of sale and mom'y from the accounts rect'iYable to be paid to plaintiff was arrived at prior to and
f'xisted contemporaneous with the execution of the agrt'\'ment.
That defendants were the actin' operators of tht'
husiness and kne'v the financial condition of the corporation and knew whether its liabilities could be paid wl1t'll
they Pntered into the contract, and they contracted in till·
light of this knowledge.
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ANS\VERING DEF'EKDANT'S ARGUMENT
POINT I
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED.

Plaintiff in his Motion for Summary Judgment (R.
L!) statPs that there is no genuine is8ue a8 to any matPrial fad8, and that plaintiff i8 entitled to judgment as
a matter of law complying with Rule 5G ( c). This is the
rnle of law which is set out in 3 cases cited on page 5 of
the defendants' Brief, which rule plaintiff has pleaded
and contends he has complied with.
'rhis court is constantly deciding cases involving
~im1mar? judgments. Rule 56 has numerous cases cited
in the 1967 pocket supplement. Plaintiffs attorney has
C'onnted 51 cases cited under Rule 5G in Shepards Utah
Citations of June 1968. Plaintiff thinks that the judges
of this court have their ideas about summary judgment
and therefore, will only make comment on the three cases
cited by the defendants, and cites one of the last cases on
Summary Judgment decided by this court on January
27, 1968, which we hereinafter discuss.
In the B1lllock vs. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc.
11 l7t. 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559, this court holds that plaintiff
\i·u..; entitled to summary judgment. In the Bullock case
plaintiff and def Pndant had entered into a written contract, no provision in the contract for the duration of
th1 employment and the court holds that where there is
no 11rovision in the contract it may be terminated by
1·ith<T party at any time. The court enforced the agree111Pnt it wouldn't let a party vary the terms of the written
agreement.
1

5

Plaintiff is objecting in this case to the defendanb'
trying to vary the terms of the wri ttl>n agreement b)·
oral evid<>ncc contending it conld Pstahlish a diffC'rent contract on facts known ·when the contract ·was entered into.
In the case of Frederick J.llay & Company 'i·s. TT'.
Prescott Dwm and Tracy Collins Trust Company, 13
U.2d 40, 3GS P.2d 266. The court sustains the Sum1nar)·
Judgment because of the fact that the plaintiff had not
proved that he complied with the terms of the contract
fr1 that they had secured a purchaser of Keith O'Brien.
In the instant case the contract provides that the
stock is to be paid for in money and defendants are trying
to vary the terms by saying it should be paid for from
the proceeds of the air conditioner and accounts receirable. We submit that as a matter of law, this cannot be
done.
The case of Smnncr Hat ch ct al v. Sugar house Fi11ance Company found at 434 P.2d 758, 20 U.2d 15G,
the court held in that case that Summary Judgment
should not have been granted because there was a qnestion of fact as to the reasonableness of attorney fees and
Judge Ellett in his opinion set out that the question of
attorney fees between attorney and client should be tried
because the relationship of the public and the attorneys
are concerned. There was a tiuestion of fact in that case
as to what was a reasonable attorney fee. It is not analoo·ous
to the case at bar in which there is no factual
b
situation but merelv the enforcement of a contract and
'
.
not allowing it to be varied by oral evidence.
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The case mentioned abow~ to bP discussed is the case
iii' Olien 11. Prc,..,ton 1:. Grnrgc J>. Lamb, 43G P.2d 1021,
~() U.2d 2GO, and WP think that ht'ad note 2 is very applieable to our casP, and we quote from the SPcond headnote
as follows:
"2. Judgment, key 185.1 (1)
To be of effective use in determination of motion for summary judt,11nent, affidavit must set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 56 ( e) ."
\Ve contend that in this case that any evidence of the
f'ontract to take the air conditioner or the accounts receivable would be varying the terms of the written contract
and \rnuld come clearly under the above quotation.
POINT II
THE SALE OF THE STOCK WAS NOT VOID BUT AN
ENFORCEABLE AGREEMENT AND AN ABSOLUTE GUARANTEE CAN BE ENFORCED EVEN THOUGH ORIGINAL
OBLIGATION IS INVALID.

DPfendants in their Brief say that the conditional
'alPs agreement was and is illegal, and thus is void and
unenforceable, claiming that The Carriage House, Inc.
eonld not buy its own stock.
Defendants cite the case of Schwab v. Getty, 145
l\'a1-1h. GG, 258 Pac. 1035, 54 A.L.R. 1382. We point out
to the Court that the 8chwab case was decided in 1927,
and relates to an old statut<> which absolutely prohibited
a eorporation from dealing in its own stock. Sub-para~raph (l) of RG\V 23.01.120 was passed in 1933. Sub7

paragraph (2), which is the one qnoted on page 8 of
appellant's brief was passed in 1947, Chapter 195, § l,
Laws of 1947.
That under the business corporation act of -Washington, as it existed prior to J nly 19G7, a corporation nncll·r
Revist•d Code of vVashington 23.01.120,
"shall have the power to purchase, hold, sell and
transfer shares of its own capital stock; provided,
that no such corporation shall use its funds or
property for the purchase of its own shares of
capital stock when such use would cause any impairment of the capital stock of the corporation.''
'I'his latter provision has been interpreted in Jackson r.
Cologrossi, 50 v\Tn. 2d 572, 313 P.2d G97, to the end that
repurchase is limited to cases where such repurchase will
not diminish the corporation's ability to pay its debt~,
or lessen the security of its creditors. In the instant case,
where the corporation was disposing of all of its physical
assets in the State of Vv ashington with the intention of
going to Utah to engage in business, the agreement to
purchase, when executed, did not in any way diminish
the corporation's ability to pay its debts or lessen the
security of its creditors.
In the Jackson v. Cologrossi supra the corporation
went into bankruptcy and its trustee brought a suit where
assets of the corporation have been used to repay the
purchase of stock. The instant case is not a suit by the
corporation, nor a suit by any creditor of the corporation
to recover assets to pay their claims. This defense i~
being used that the entering into the contract was illegal.
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Thl' PntPring into tlw contract was not illegal. It was
::;omething which the corporation could contract to do
providing it would not affect their creditors. No evidence
tliat any creditor has not been paid.

'l1he Jackson v. Cologrossi case is not a case like the
one at bar, where the sole owners of the corporation, the
d('fendants, purchased the stock of the other remaining
stockholder in the corporation. The creditors are in no
lllanner affected. This defense would not be available to
the managers or owners of the corporation, but merely
by the creditors.
Admittedly, the Jackson case says what the appellants quote. However, the important aspects of that case
is that the trial court found there was no earned surplus
with which to pay. The transaction was treated as though
a cash payment had been made, and as of that date the
corporation was unable to pay its debts in the usual course
of business and was rendered still further insolvent by
the re-purchase payment. The importance of this point
lwcomes more clear if the Court will look at Burk v. Cor11Jerative Finance Corporation, 62 Wn. 2d 740, 384 P.2d
1)18. This case involved the validity of a stock repurchase
agreement by a cooperative, and the court held that
RGW 23.01.120 did relate to cooperatives as well as genrral corporations. In that particular case, the Court cited
with approval In re West Waterway Lumber Co., 59
\rn. 2d 310, 367 P.2d 807, and although this is not quoted
in the Burke case, the Court in the \Vest \Vaterway case
(li<i say:

9

''Until the enactmtmt of \Vhat is now RC\r
23.01.120 (2) in l!J-17, corporntiom; eonld not. npurchase shares of thPir own stock."
rrhe Hnrk decision, aftn refrrring to the applieahilit>· of the statute, tlwn sets forth the rnh~ that the application d<•pt>nds on the solvenc~· of the corporation when tlt(•
not<~ ht-came due, not wlwn it was issued, and later near
the t>nd of tht- decision, the Court discusses tlw primary
point, which w<~ believe of consequence, \vhcn, in discussing whether some of the obligation might not be collectable the Court says:
"This proration is justifiable because as previously discussed the re-purchase of stock is not
void at its inception; rather, it is the impainrw11t
of capital resulting from the re-purchase payment
which is verboten."
In the instant case the contract was valid, it only
lwing that the corporation could have defended on a snit
if payments wer€' not made on the grounds that the payment would impair the capital stock, but this does not
mean that the obligation is not a proper one.
On Page !) of the Brief, the appellants state that at
the time of the execution of the agreemnt, the corporation's liabilities exceeded its assets and that it was unable
to pay its debts in the usual course of business, which
fact was only known to the defendants and not to the
plaintiffs. However, under the Burk case, this is immaterial and they have failed to show that the corporation.
when the paymenb; became dne, was unable to pay it~
debts or was insolvent.
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On Page 10, thP appellanfo quote from the case of
HofJ<'Y r. Walton Lwnber Compa11y) 17 ·wash. 2d 242, 135
l'.:ld 90, 145 A.L.R 924, bnt unfortunately they do not
rnah a complete quote of the rule set forth in that case.
There is in that case a statenwnt that one of the exceptions to the general rnle that the liability of the principal
<ld.Jtor measures and limits the liability of the guarantor
i:-; that the guarantee may stand by itself, though the
obligation guaranteed is unenforceable, where it can fairly
be said• that such was the intention of the parties. This
same rule is found in A. ill. Castle & Co. v. Public Service
U11derwritcrs) 198 Wash. 576, 89 P.2d 506. An even better
(•ase is Backits V. Fceks) 71 vVash. 508, 129 Pac. 86 wherein
it is said that a guaranty contract may stand by itself
though the obligation guaranteed is invalid. The instant
rase involves one of an absolute guarantee that the obligation is not invalid under the Burk case, although it
111ight be unenforceable.
Another case which might be of assistance to the
Court is Amick v. Baugh) 66 vVn. 2d 298, 402 P.2d 342.
Jn this case there is a good discussion of what an absolute
~uarantee is, and it falls right in line with the other
cases.
Again referring to the case of Robey v. Walton Lumlll'r Company, 17 vVash. 2d 242, 135 P.2d 95, 145 A.L.R.
!1:!4, this case was cited by the plaintiff to the trial court
and the instant case is an absolute guarantee and on page
102 of the Pacific, Column 2, Paragraph 17, it states:
11

'• ( 17) All of tlH· authorit;; S('('lll to hold that
wlwrP tlw guaranty is ahsolnt(•, and 1>ro\·idPs for
th(• pa~;11wnt of a s11(•cifiPd sum or sums at fixwl
pPriods, liability of tlH· gnanrntor lwe011H·s fiwd
on ddault of the prineipal. \VP an' satisfied that
th<' guaranty h('re in question is an absolute and
unconditional one.
In the instant case, the guarantor, by expn•ss
words, absolutt•ly and nneonditionally guarantePd
tlH• pay11wnt of the principal and interest of the
bonds. The timP of 1my11wnt and the amount dur
WN<' ddinitely fixed hy the bonds themselves an<l
by the trust mortgage."
Undt>r the Robey l'. lF alton Lwnber Company case
it is an absolntr guarantee and the liability affixed as if
it was contracted originally by the Ryttings and in fact
that is wlwre tlw eontract was. ':L1hat the defendants do
not allege or set out payment or that there was an agree11wnt after the contract was enfrred into that as payment
of the contract tlw air conditioner "-as given to the plaintiff or that accounts recei\·ahle were to be given to the
plaintiff as payment.
POINT III
THE TERMS OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT CANNOT BE
VARIED BY P AROL EVIDENCE.

'l'his is a ver>· fnndanwntal rnk•, but we wish ta
<1uote this genPral wrll-known rnk• from 30 Am. Jur 2d,
Sec. 101G page 149 as follows:

''101G Gt>nerally.
'l'he well-established gr1wral rule is that wht'l'I'
the partiPs to a eontract luwe d1:•liherately put
their enaao-e11H•nt
in writina
in sneh tN111s as i111b
b
b
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port a legal obligation without any uncertainty
as to the object or Pxtent of such (~ngagement, it
is conclusively presnnwd that the entire engagement of the parties, and the extent and manner of
their undertaking, have been reduced to writing,
and all parol evidence of prior or contemporaneous conversations or declarations tending to substitute a new and different contract for the one
evidenced by the writing is incompetent. Stated
otherwise, the intention of the parties as evidenced
by the legal import of the language of a valid
written contract cannot ordinarily be varied by
parol proof of a different intention. A narrower
statement of the rule appears in some cases to
the effect that the parol evidence rule excludes
only evidence of the language used by the parties
in making the contract other than that which is
furnished by the instrument itself. THE RULE
IS ALSO STATED 'J10 EXCLUDE THE COLLOQUIUM OR ORAL NEGOTIATION LEADING TO THE VERY CONTRACT, -WHICH
THE PARTIES CONSUMMA'l1 ED BY REDUCING IT TO WRITING.
The parol evidence rule as applied to contracts is simply that as a matter of substantive
law, a certain act - that is, the act of embodying
the complete terms of an agreement in a writing
- becomes the contract of the parties. The rule
comes into operation when there is a single and
final memorial of the understanding of the parties; when that takes place, prior and contemporaneous negotiations are excluded, or as is sometimes said, the written memorial supersedes these
prior or contemporaneous negotiations."
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1'ht>n• an• a nH1tilwr of l 'tah enRe8 in the Pacifie digt'8t, all of whid1 affirm thP gpm•ral rnle alwve 8d ont,
and thi8 eomt, 8peaking through .T HRticl~ HP1Hiod in tltl·
caRe of Je11srn's Cscd Cars 1·. James 1'. Rice, 7 U 2d 2/(i,
:t23 P.2d 25~), rpaffirn1s thi8 doctrine in the following
lanJ..,'1.tage and we q note from Paragraph 3 Page 2G0-2Gl
and the entirety of Paragraph 4:
(3) Elenwntary it is that in con8truing contracts we seek to determine the intentions of thl'
parties. But it is also elenwntan· and of extrenH'
practical importance that we hold contracting partie8 to their cl<:'ar and underntandable language
dPlilH_•rately committed to writing and endorsed by
them a8 8ignatorie8 thereto. \Vere this not so
business, one with another among our citizens,
would be relegated to the chaotic, and the basic
purpose of the law to supply enforceable rules of
conduct for the maintenance and improvement of
an orderly society's welfare and progress would
find itsPlf impotent. * * * The rule excluding
mattPrs outside the four corners of a clear, undPr
Rtandable docmnent, is a fair one, and one ·8 contentions concerning his intent should Pxtend no
further than his own ck•ar expressions.
( 4) It was urged corrt>ctly that to admit matters outside a contract would do violence to the
principle that one is bound by hi8 manift>statiom
of ass<mt, and that, irrespective of such contention, such matters properl>- are excludable hy tlw
parol evidence rule, - \\-hich rule, eoumwl suggP8ts, is om• of substantin' law rather than om' of
Pvidenct>. "ThateYPr kind one calls it, the rnk
that exclndPs surh Pvidl•nce is a common RPTI~l'
rule.
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CONCLUSION

'V (' snbmit that there is no competent evidence men-

tiniwd in the affidavit which would require the introdncton of evi<lenc(•, and thP defendants should not bl' allowed
to vary the terms of the \nittPn contract.
rrhat under ·washington statuh•s and cases, a \Vashington corporation may purchase its own stock and it
i::< not void.
'l1hat the defendants signed an absolute guarantee
and nnder vVashington law are liable whether the corporation would be liable or not.
\Ve submit the J ndgnwnt of the trial court should be
rnstained.
Respectfully submitted,
GOLDEN \V.ROBBINS
705 Newhouse Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
JOHN S. MOORE of
Velikanje, Moore and
Countryman
Yakima, \Vashington
Attorneys for the Respondent
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EXHIBIT A
CONDITIONAL SALJ<~ OF STOCK AUHEI~MI~NT
'rhis Agn•('IJH'nt rnadf' and <·nt<•r('d into this :Z7th dav
of May, 19(i(i, b.'· and lwtm'<·n HAHOLD D. HAINFOHJ),
hl·reinaft('r rPfrrrPd to as "\' <·rnlor,'' arnl THI~ CA HHIAOE HOl'SE, INC., a Washington ('orporation, hen·inafter referred to as "Y ende(',"
\VITNESSETH:
\VIIEREAS, Yendor is presently the owner of twenty-five (25) shares of stock in THE CARRIAOE
HOUSE, INC., a \Vashington corporation; and,
\VHEREAS, it is the desire of thl• parties hereto to
providP for the sale by tlw Y endor to Yend<'e of the Y Pndor's inh'rest and shares of stock in said corporation,
NO\V, THEREI~ORI~, in consideration of tlw mutual eovPnants, conditions and provisions hereinafter sd
forth and th<> payments to be made, it is hereby agTPl'(l
by the parties hereto as follows:

1.
Subject to the terms and conditions of this agreemt>nt
as set forth bl'low, Yendor does lwreby sdl and as;-;ig11,
and Yendee does hereh.'- purchase, YPnclor's said t\\·entyfive (25) shares of stock in said corporation, the shan·~
of stock being evidenced by stock el'rtificate No. 3.

2.
The purchasc> price for said shares of stoek is T\\"0
THOUSAND FIYE HlT?\DRED DOLLAHS ($2,500.001.
to lwar interPf't at the rate of six p<'revnt (Ii<;{) per am11111 1
from thP 10th clay of A ugnst, 19GG, payable as foll<ms:

16

At the rat<' of ONI~ HUNDRED DOLLAHS ($100)
1J('r month, ('Olllllll'llC'ing on or bdore tlH• 10th day of
Augw..;t, l~HiG, and on or bPfon~ the• 10th da \' of each ·snc('('('di11g month until the• prineipal and int.Pn•st i:::; fully
paid; provich·d, lHrn·e\ n, that the Pntin• obligation, plu:::;
al'enwd inkrest, shall lw payable~ in full on or hefore the
Wtl1 day of FdJrnary, 1%8. From Pach monthly pa,nnent
tlil'n' sltall first be deductc•d inkn•st upon tlw unpaid balanee of the principal indehkd1wss at the rate of six perl'(•nt (G)r) per annmu, and the remainder of each monthly
installment shall be applied to the reduction of the printipal indebtedness.

3.
For the purpose of securing tlw obligation of V endee,
tlH· VPndor shall retain the title and possession of said
~lmres of :::;toek (as evidencPd by the said stock certificate)
until full and final performance of Vl'ndee's obligation
hPrein, and thereafter Y endor shall deliver the possession
of the said certificate and properly endorse the same to
tl1e V endee.
4.
Until this contract has been fully performed by VenrlPP and satisfied by Vendor, the hooks and records of
the emupany shall at all times show the interest of the
\'c·ndor in the shares of ::;toek hereby ::;old to the Vendee.
\'(•nd<'e shall have all rights to ::;aid stock, including the
right to vote ::;aid ::;tock and recPive dividends thereon;
provided, however, that Vernke ::;hall have no right to
tnm::;fer, sell, mortgage, pledgP, Pncmnber or otherwise
di~pose of said stock or any of the rights or obligations
llll'.iclent to the ownership in any manner until full satisJ'aetion of this contract.

5.
Time is of thl' e::;::;pncP of thi~ contract, and if Vendee
Jails or nPglPcts to comply ~with any of the terms, cov-
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enants or conditions of this eontrad, lw<·o111Ps insolnn!,
makes an assigm1wnt for th1• lH•1wfit o!' en·ditors, or i~
a<lju<licat<'d a bankrupt, or if a n•e<>iv<·r is appoint<>d 111
a<lrninist<'r th<• affairs of Y<·rnh•1•, th<'n Y<>ndor i->hall ha\"1·
t}w right and option to (a) tPn11inat<' thi8 eontraet and
imm<'<liately re-a8sert ahsolntl> O\\'nl'rnhip of the sto('k
sold hen•hy, rdaining all rnoni<'8 tlH•r<>for paid 011 thi~
contract by Y t•nd<'<' as liquidated damag<·s for tlw nonfulfillnH·nt of this eontract, ancl the use and depreciation
of tlw }H'O]JL>rty interPst for which said stock is <~vidL'nr(·,
and tlwreupon all right and int<•rest of the Yen<lee in thP
stock lH·rPb~- sold shall l'<'HS<' and tl>nninate; or (b) to
declare the entin~ n•maining balance dne hen'lmder forthwith due and payablr and bring 8Uit and recover judg-ment thPrefor, togethC'r with a reasonable sum as attorneys' fees.

6.
It is agreed and undNstood that any action at law
or Pquity arising out of this contract betwePn the partiPs
herdo 8hall lie in the Sn1wrior Court of the State of
'Vashington in and for Yakima County. In the fnrtlwr
event of litigation between the parti<•s lwreto relatin).[
to tlw rights or duties ari8ing out of this rontrad, th1·
}H'evailing party in such litigation shall hC' rntitkd to
recover attorm·ys' foes in addition to costs taxable hy
law, the amount thereof to be fixed by the court.

7.
ThC'rr are no conditions or provisions of this agTl't'ment bebn•Pn tlw parties lwrdo rplating to th<> suhjed
matter of this contract whieh are not contairn•d h1·rPin.
nor rl'pres<'ntations nor warrantit•s not l'XprPi->8ly eoutained hC'rPin. This contrart contains the Pntire aµ.Tc 1·
ment lwtwC'L'n the parties hereto.
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s.
Xo wain·r hy Y<'ndor of

an~·

<ld'anlt, d<>lay or breach

hy \'cndee shall OJH'rat<' as \Yain•r of any ::mbsequent

dd'anlt, delay or brPach by \\•ndet'.

9.
rrhis eontract shall be binding npon and cnure to
the: benefit of tlw parties herc~to, their lwirs, m;signs, 1wr~011al rq>resentatives and succ<'ssors; providt>d, however,
that Y<'ndee shall not assign, transfer or in any way
attempt to dispose of the stock sold, nor of V endee's
rights nnder this contract without prior written consent
o[ Y t•ndor. Any such att<•mpted assignment, transfer or
disposal without the consent of Vendor shall be void.

IN wrrNESS 'VHEREOF, the parties hereto have
1H·rc1mto set their hands the day and year first above
written.
/s/

Harold D. Rainford
Vendor

THE CARRIAGE HOUSE,
INC., Vendee

By Suzanne H. Rytting /s/
President

L'nclersigned hen·by personally guarantee full payment

allcl performance of the above conditional sales contract
by The Carriage House, Inc.

/s/

vVm. R. Rytting

/s/

Suzanne H. Rytting
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